OPINION – Xia Baolong’s visit to Hong Kong and its political implications | Macau Business

The six-day visit of Xia Baolong, the Director of the Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO), to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) from April 13 to 19 had very important implications for how Beijing deals with the HKSAR after the two sessions.

First, since the 70-year-old Xia remains in the office as the Director of the HKMAO, his stay means that the central government needs time to groom his successor. Most importantly, Xia visited Hong Kong immediately after the HKMAO was integrated into the party centre rather than staying in the State Council as an organ. The implication of such organizational change is that the Party at the centre recentralized the functions and work of the HKMAO instead of delegating the tasks to the State Council. The centralization of the HKMAO under the Communist Party of China (CPC) means that Xia had to visit the HKSAR immediately to report to the Party centre on the development and affairs of the HKSAR shortly after the two sessions.

Second, Xia has been appointed as the deputy group leader of the Central Hong Kong and Macau Work Leading Small Group (hereafter HKMWLSG), whose group leader is the new member of the Politburo Standing Committee, namely Ding Xuexiang. The other five deputy group leaders are Xia Baolong, the united front department head Shi Taifeng, the secretary of the central political and legal commission Chen Wenqing, the minister of public security Wang Xiaohong, and the foreign minister Qin Gang.

Although Xia is no longer a Central Committee member, the fact that he has been appointed as the deputy group leader of the HKMWLSG means that the CPC relies on the HKMAO Director to keep abreast of the updated developments of both Hong Kong and Macau. As such, his visit to the HKSAR demonstrated the Party’s deep concerns about the HKSAR’s developments. It can be expected that Xia would have to write up a report about Hong Kong to the HKMWLSG, for his visit was regarded as “an investigation and a study trip,” a typical mainland-style of study made by a high-level official from the central government to the locality for an in-depth understanding of the circumstances.

Third, the Hong Kong media have neglected an important move just three days prior to Xia’s visit to Hong Kong – he attended an educational mobilization session of the HKMAO on the implementation of the Chinese-style socialist thought in the Xi Jinping era. During the session, Xia delivered a speech saying that education is an important aspect of the Chinese-style socialism under the Xi Jinping era, and that the HKMAO staff members would have to develop the spirit of struggles, to promote the work of governing the Party strictly, and to create “an iron military” over the Hong Kong and Macau work.

Xia urged the HKMAO colleagues to conduct investigation and research, and to consolidate Party work over Hong Kong and Macau affairs. Interestingly and significantly, the newly created Central Leading Group Number 23, which is responsible for education in the entire country, had its group leader Wu Wenrong attending the meeting. Wu added that education work needed division of labour, and that it had to realize “political self-awareness and political positioning.” The presence of Wu in the meeting and the remarks of Xia pointed to the importance of education work within the HKMAO and over Hong Kong and Macau.

Fourth, related to the importance of education work over Hong Kong was Xia’s interactions with the young people in the HKSAR, including students at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and young scientists at the InnoHK Research Centre. Xia also met secondary and primary school children and his visit to schools was accompanied by Chief Executive John Lee and the Secretary for Education Choi Yuk-lin – an event showing his concern about the development of national education. He played ping pong with primary school children, asking them to study hard and treasure the valuable opportunities for their development. Obviously, youth development is one of the important agendas in his visit in conformity with the emphasis on education work during the HKMAO meeting with the participation of Wu Wenrong from Central leading Group Number 23 on April 10.

Fifth, Xia’s public speeches in the HKSAR pointed to the top priority of maintaining national security, saying that chaos was harmful to Hong Kong, that opposition is not equivalent to democracy, that parade is not the only means of expressing public demands. Obviously, from the central government’s assessment of Hong Kong, partly because the HKSAR’s Covid restrictions were just lifted about two months ago, and mainly because the HKSAR is embedded with potential elements that can destabilize the society and polity suddenly, the emphasis on the protection of national security is understandable – a stress that was in conformity with the CPC’s report on Hong Kong during the 20^th Party Congress and the two sessions.

Sixth, if national security is still in command, it is natural that the legislation on Article 23 will be tabled in the Legislative Council as a matter of time. The HKSAR authorities remain ambiguous on the timeline of legislating on Article 23 – it may be in 2023 or the latest in 2024. This ambiguity is attributable to the fact that the final decision will be rested with the central government in Beijing.

Bearing in mind that the extradition bill in 2019 led to protests and violence – an event with the unintended consequence of benefitting the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s presidential elections in January 2020 – the timing of legislating on Article 23 in the HKSAR is naturally the decision of Beijing. In Hong Kong, some supporters of early enactment of Article 23 have argued that since Hong Kong is stable, legislating on Article 23 will gain mass support without any impacts. However, those who were having reservations have argued that legislating on Article 23 would give another ammunition to the DPP in the upcoming presidential campaign in Taiwan. Both perspectives have their compelling arguments, from an objective perspective. Hence, it can be anticipated that the final decision of the timing of tabling the legislation on Article 23 will be up to the HKMWLSG, especially as the work on Hong Kong and Macau is now centralized by the Party.

Seventh, Xia emphasized in his visit to Hong Kong that district administration will also need to uphold patriotic rule. Such a remark points to the strong likelihood, as reported in the Hong Kong media, that appointments will return to the District Councils. Most importantly, it can be anticipated that less than half of the seats in each of the 18 District Councils will be directly elected. It is unknown whether the percentage of directly elected portion of the seats would be 30 percent of 40 percent, however. The HKSAR government would perhaps release a document in the new composition of the District Councils. It can also be predicted that some of the seats would be appointed by the government and such appointees would include pro-establishment community elites and activists.

Moreover, some young people and district leaders from the District Fight Crime Committees (DFCC) and District Fire Safety Committees (DFSC) would have the possibility of electing their own members to District Councils. Alternatively, the government would just appoint members from the DFCC and DFSC. Ideally, indirect elections can be introduced. If over 50 percent of the seats of District Councils would be returned by appointments, the move would be disappointing to many liberal-minded Hong Kong people and district activists.

Whatever the proportion of directly elected, indirectly elected and appointed seats in District Councils, the responses from pro-Beijing political parties and groups will deserve our attention and analyses, because some pro-Beijing parties have already groomed a batch of local politicians who get used to participation in local elections. Appointments would likely and ironically reduce the chances of some street-level and directly elected politicians to return to District Councils.

Eighth, Xia’s remarks on the common-law system deserve our attention, because he mentioned for the first time that the common law system can “very well protect national security.” This is the first time a central-level official who points to the compatibility between the common law system and the national security law in the HKSAR. As such, the top-level officials in Beijing realize the importance of retaining and cherishing the common law system in its protection of the rule of law and national security in the HKSAR.

Xia’s visit to Hong Kong coincided with the visits of Hong Kong’s court judges, lawyers, and barristers to Beijing – mutual exchanges helpful to enhance deeper understanding. Most importantly, such mutual understanding would assist the HKSAR government in the process of legislating on Article 23 of the Basic Law later. In fact, Xia met some barristers in Hong Kong, and he urged them to support the Secretary for Justice, implying they should also back up the legislation of Article 23 and other security-related Internet law.

Ninth, Xia met some Hong Kong businesspeople, asking them to be confident of Hong Kong, assuring them of the rosy business prospects in the HKSAR, and encouraging them to invest in and integrate into the Greater Bay Area (GBA). Some media have pointed to the relative absence of land developers in Xia’s meetings; nevertheless, at a time when the central government in Beijing emphasizes the importance of achieving “common prosperity” and minimizing the poverty gap in the mainland, it was wise for Xia to keep a certain distance with the big land developers in the HKSAR. If the HKSAR government may need to introduce more tax reforms in the coming years due to budget deficit and financial constraints, maintaining a distance with the land developers was an appropriate move to signal the autonomy of Beijing’s officials from the influence of the big business in the HKSAR.

Tenth, upholding the principle of patriotic governance, Xia visited the Legislative Council and interacted with the newly elected legislators. He emphasized that Hong Kong’s democracy is different from the Western democracy, and that legislators should engage the government through rational discussion and deliberation. Xia as the central official rejected the oppositional tactics as displayed by the democrats in the legislature after the sovereignty transfer in 1997 to the political chaos in the latter half of 2019. Following Xia’s visit, the legislators have embarked on a visit to the Greater Bay Area – a move that signals a reciprocal move by Hong Kong’s power elite to demonstrate the HKSAR’s commitment to integrating closely with the mainland, both economically and socially.

Overall, Xia Baolong’s six-day visit to Hong Kong was politically significant. It highlighted the Party’s centralization over Hong Kong and Macau affairs and the new Leading Group’s work on the HKSAR, thereby necessitating Xia’s visit and report to the Party centre. The HKMAO is also under the education work of the Leading Group Number 23, meaning that the new office must conduct education work on Hong Kong. Xia’s visit therefore reached out to the youth.

Emphasizing the paramount importance of national security, Xia had Article 23 legislation in his mind, but leaving the timeline ambiguous and to the Party centre for its final decision. He grasped the opportunity of lobbying some barristers for support. Xia stressed the compatibility of the common law system with the national security law regime, appealing to the business sector for confidence and its need to make use of the vast market in the Greater Bay Area. Upholding the principle of patriotic rule over Hong Kong, Xia implied that District Councils would witness the return of appointed seats – the question is the extent to which appointed seats would be reinjected. Upholding the principle of patriotic rule over Hong Kong, Xia’s visit to the Legislative Council signalled the central government’s preference of stability over chaos, and of the executive-led system over a system of executive-legislative confrontations.