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Judging from the ways in which China brokered an agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia to reestablish their diplomatic relations and from the content of Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang’s answers to questions in the two sessions of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), some new features of the “great power diplomacy” practiced by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have recently been emerging, namely active mediation in international disputes and the stress on a non-Western style modernization, apart from Beijing’s previous emphases on multilateralism, anti-hegemonism, the world’s peaceful development, “a common destiny for the mankind,” mutual respect and cooperation, and an insistence in independence and autonomy of its foreign policy.
An important essay written by
the former Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the “Comprehensive Promotion of Great
Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics” was published by the People’s
Daily on November 8, 2022 – an article that was simultaneously printed on
the website of the PRC Foreign Ministry (see website: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202211/t20221108_10801907.shtml).
The article carried several
points pertinent to China’s great power diplomacy. First, it referred to the
objective of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to adopt its great power
diplomacy for the sake of achieving the Chinese renaissance. This is a
politically and historically significant point as China during the nineteenth
century suffered from the humiliation and invasion of foreign imperialism.
Since the early 2000s, the rise of the PRC has, from a nationalistic
perspective, transformed China from its history of humiliation by foreign
powers to a new emergent “great power” with its unique diplomacy in dealing
with the Western world, especially the Western allies of the United States. In
short, the foundation of China’s great power diplomacy is based on nationalism
and anti-imperialism. As Wang Yi stressed in his article, the CPC used 100
years to reshape China and to restore its confidence in the international
world.
Second, China’s great power
diplomacy is punctuated with a high degree of international socialism, but this
kind of new international socialism is not based on revolutionary diplomacy as
espoused by the Maoists in the PRC under the leadership of the late Chairman
Mao Zedong. Instead, the achievement of world peace and the creation of the
“common destiny of the mankind” are the twin objectives of China’s great power
diplomacy – dual objectives tainted with socialist tone and ideals.
Third, Wang Yi stressed that
China has a new role in the world of international conflicts and
confrontations. He has argued that “democratization of international relations”
is an inevitable trend. As such, China is against unilateralism, protectionism
and hegemonism – a remark implying that those countries, notably the US, are arguably
outdated in the world of economic interdependence. Because the US under the
former President Donald Trump adopted a prominent foreign policy marked by
unilateralism, protectionism and hegemonism, China grasped a golden opportunity
to fill in an international vacuum left by Washington and yet easily become an
ideological foe of the US.
Fourth, the concept of great
power diplomacy, as Wang Yi said in his article, could be traced back to 2014,
when the CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping remarked in the Central Foreign
Affairs Work Committee that the PRC must establish its “Chinese features, style
and elegance” in its foreign policy. In 2017, the concept of “comprehensive
promotion of great power with Chinese characteristics” was adopted in 2017 as
“a leading thought and strategic design.” In 2018, President Xi Jinping
emphasized again in the Central Foreign Affairs Committee that great power
diplomacy aimed at achieving the Chinese renaissance, human progress and the
“common destiny for the mankind.” The mixture of Chineseness and socialist tone
of having the “common destiny for the mankind” became a prominent feature of
the new Chinese foreign policy.
Fifth, Wang Yi emphasized that
the role of the CPC in foreign affairs has been strengthened since the 20th
Party Congress, like its leadership in convening the Central Foreign Affairs
Work Committee and other seminars on China’s neighboring foreign affairs work.
The role of the Party, according to Wang, has been consolidated and its coordination
work has been strengthened.
Wang Yi’s insight above is
important. The most recent reorganization of the Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office
(HKMAO) into the CPC’s remit has been interpreted by some Hong Kong media as a
“promotion” of the office’s status. However, arguably, such a move should be
interpreted more accurately as the CPC’s centralization of the State Council’s
organs. Some other organs under the State Council, such as the monetary
committee office, the national scientific ethics committee, and the state asset
supervision management committee, have all been incorporated into the CPC – a
top-down reform rather than a bottom-up promotion.
Clearly, there has been more a
centralization of the State Council’s functions than the “promotion” of its
organs. The Party’s centralization of some functions of the State Council means
that, theoretically and practically, the relations between the CPC and the
government have already been tipped in favor of the Party’s strong leadership,
coordination and communication. If Party-state persists in Chinese politics, it
is the Party that leads the state institutions and organs.
Sixth and finally, an important
feature of China’s great power diplomacy is to protect its national
sovereignty, security and developmental interest, specifically the combat
against those “separatist” elements in Taiwan. Here, China insists on the usage
of “one country, two systems” to deal with Taiwan’s political future, although
the official discourse has emphasized that the “Taiwan model” of “one country,
two systems” can be explored further.
In recent months, the PRC has
resumed more human and economic interactions with the Taiwan side,
demonstrating that, from now to the presidential election in Taiwan in January
2024, Beijing’s great power diplomacy is to squeeze Taiwan’s “diplomatic” space
further by winning more international countries that recognize Taiwan
diplomatically. A recent announcement made by the Honduran authorities that
they would like to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC away from their
recognition of Taiwan is a good example of how Beijing is conducting united
front work on Taiwan’s “diplomatic” friends.
On March 14, Honduras President
Xiomara Castro said she instructed her foreign minister Eduardo Enrique Reina
to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. Reina expressed gratitude to
Taiwan’s support in the past since the two countries established diplomatic
relations in 1941, but reports pointed to the pragmatic need of Honduras to
seek China’s financial assistance in its infrastructure development, notably
the dam projects and hydroelectricity stations at Patuca. As a matter of fact,
when the former Honduras President Porfirio Lobo was in power from 2010 to
2014, his foreign minister Arturo Corrales Alvarez adopted an appeasement
policy toward Taiwan on the one hand and yet Alvarez brought finance minister
William Chong Wong to visit Beijing to explore the possibility of establishing
diplomatic relations on the other hand. If so, economic needs and pragmatism
are the driving force in favor of China’s great power diplomacy in which one of
the key objectives is to win the hearts and minds of Taiwan’s diplomatic
friends.
Wang Yi’s important article in
November 2022 should be read together with the most recent answers of Foreign
Minister Qin Gang to fourteen questions in the NPC and CPPCC sessions in March.
Qin made most of the points that had already been articulated by Wang in the
November 2022 article, but four points were prominent in Qin’s answers.
First, Qin argued that
modernization is not equivalent to Westernization and that it has to be
designed by all countries with the right to select their own path and to grasp
their own destiny, just like what China has done. This important answer points
to the fact that the rise of China has been attributable to the PRC’s own
search for its developmental path without blindly copying from the West. Qin
even said: “The Chinese style of modernization does not rely on war,
colonialization and plunder. Instead, we insist on peace, development,
cooperation, win-win situation, and the harmonization between the human being
and nature – a new path different from Western style of modernization.”
Qin’s elaboration above is
politically, economically and diplomatically significant. The China model of
development and modernization differ from the Western style of modernization,
illustrating their differences in history, tradition, culture and strategic
choices.
Perhaps, as the late political
scientist Samuel Huntington put it, the Sinic (Chinese) civilization was a far
cry from the Western civilization in that the former attaches more importance
to harmony, hierarchy and internal obedience while the latter attaches more
value to pluralism, equality and contention.
Second, Qin mentions that
Sino-US relations would take a turn for the worse if the US side cannot handle
the Taiwan issue skillfully. He contended that the US should keep its hands off
from Taiwan and that it should “stop using Taiwan to contain” mainland China –
a warning that if the US really turns Taiwan into its protectorate, Beijing would
perhaps consider taking strong action against Taiwan and/or the US.
Third, Qin said that the US is
“containing” China through the so-called “Indo-Pacific strategy,” and that
Japan should not join the US in becoming the “Asian NATO.” Qin reminded Japan
of its historical invasion and atrocities in China during the Second World War,
trying to instill a sense of historical guilt into the psyche of at least some Japanese
leaders and political elites. Qin appealed to Japan to cooperate with China in
a win-win situation, emphasizing the importance of economic benefits and
pragmatism.
Fourth, Qin added that China
supports the strategic autonomy of the Middle East states. Most importantly,
China would adopt “an impartial attitude to support Middle East states to solve
political questions through dialogue and coordination” – a remark that
precipitated how China later brokered a deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia to
reestablish their diplomatic relations after both countries had cut their ties
in January 2016. Qin emphasized that China would be “willing to be a promoter
and cooperator” of Middle East’s security, stability, prosperity and
solidarity.
In conclusion, China’s great
power diplomacy has been evolving quickly. Previously, the PRC leaders, including
President Xi Jinping and former Foreign Minister Wang Yi, emphasized the
elements of multilateralism, anti-hegemonism, the maintenance of the world’s
peaceful development, “the common destiny for the mankind,” mutual respect and
cooperation, and the insistence in independent and autonomous foreign policy.
Wang Yi’s important November 2022 article pointed to the important features of
international peaceful socialism in the psyche of top Chinese leaders and
foreign policy-makers, the leadership and centralization of the CPC in China’s
foreign policy-making, and the emphasis on Beijing’s outreach to win the Taiwan
friends in the international world. Qin Gang’s important answers to the
questions in the NPC and CPPCC sessions demonstrated at least two new characteristics
in China’s great power diplomacy: Beijing’s willingness and determination to
act as a mediator in international disputes, as evidenced in the successful
brokerage between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and China’s portrayal of its success
in adopting a non-Western style of modernization. This non-Western style of
modernization, as shown in the China model of socio-economic development, is
perhaps increasingly attractive to many developing states which do not see
total Westernization as an ideology acceptable to their historical tradition
and cultural circumstances. Still and perhaps unfortunately, ideological
divergence remains an enduring feature of international politics where the US
and its Western allies are seeing the other non-Western side composed of
Russia, China and other developing states as the ideological competitors.
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