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By Dr Adrian Haack
The German philosophy surrounding arms exports is not easy for outsiders to understand. The country that actively started two world wars did not interpret its advanced defence industry as a means of foreign policy. It was not used as a strategic instrument, as the USA, France or Russia have always done. The German Ministry of Economic Affairs is therefore responsible for the export of military equipment. However, when German Minister of Economic Affairs Robert Habeck (The Greens) was in India in July, he covered other topics. Habeck’s delegation also included the conservative opposition MP Tilman Kuban, who strongly supported arms deals between Germany and India in an interview.
But let’s look a few months back: India’s voting in the UN on the Ukraine war caused astonishment in Germany. Delhi openly justified its neutrality on the matter with its dependence on Russian arms imports. India cannot afford to show any sign of military weakness vis-à-vis China and Pakistan and in order to continue to provide a credible deterrent, arms cooperation with Moscow is essential in the medium term. In the past, Germany has made no moves to strengthen India militarily. Berlin is therefore not really in a position to criticize India’s dependence on Moscow’s weapons. And is aware of that. But even today, exports are still stalling. The latest example is engines for the new light battle tank, which India has already asked for back in August 2022.
In the past, Germany has primarily supplied its own troops, NATO partners and a few selected states. The guiding principle of its weaponry exports was: No weapons to crisis areas. But since the start of the war in Ukraine, German foreign policy has turned 180 degrees. Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Chancellor Scholz’s Social Democratic Party was the most Russia-friendly party in the West and was always cautious about arms exports. Scholz’s party was part of coalition governments for 22 years.
The Greens led by Habeck and Foreign Minister Baerbock have their roots in the peace movement during the Cold War and campaigned for a restrictive export policy only in the 2021 elections. An unreflective pacifism was part of the party’s DNA. Since the beginning of the war, a certain pattern seems to repeat itself in German party policies. While the conservatives, who are in the opposition, push for increased arms supplies to Ukraine and dominate public opinion, the ruling Social Democrats block and delay this process by listing increasingly more abstract reasons.
The future looks foreseeable: The Greens will give in at some point. Scholz will continue to block. The abstract reasons disappear and Germany will supply more weapons. When delivering the Leopard 2 main battle tanks, the German government openly communicated that this decision would depend on the USA.
The traditionally pro-Russian SPD committed itself to the USA without any pressure, while the traditionally transatlantic conservative opposition did not want to depend on the USA to make a decision. Germany didn’t become the second biggest provider of weaponry for Ukraine because of Scholz but despite him. This small excursion into Ukraine is necessary to understand the enormous change in German security policy. Foreign Minister Baerbock gave an interview with Fox News in September in which she called Xi a dictator. As a reminder: Baerbock belongs to the Greens and is not a conservative. One should not underestimate Baerbock. She adapted to the new situation way better than Scholz.
There is another reason why Ukraine is important for the Indo-German arms relations. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is based on the same colonial philosophy as Chinese aggressions in the Himalayas and elsewhere. Anyone who strengthens Ukraine against Russia should logically also help India against China. For India, as for many other countries, the German government must answer the question of what “expanding security and defence policy cooperation” (German Indo-Pacific guidelines) looks like in practice. It mentions participation in forums, and exercises as well as the deployment of liaison officers and “various forms of maritime presence”.
The arms policy approach is expressed in the mention of arms control thirteen times. But if Germany does not use its efficient arms industry as an instrument of security policy, then the German instrument box will be empty. Arms cooperation is an effective foreign policy instrument to face Moscow and Beijing. The same applies to Paris and Washington, which have already cemented the future NATO-India relationship with their massive arms policy commitment in India – without Berlin. Particularly for Germany, which seeks to avoid military involvement, armaments cooperation apart from “soft power” is the only option for action. The progress in submarines 212A is a very good development. They are the best in the world and the Indo-Pacific will be safer if India has them.
But let’s also look at India: Many states face the “Russian arms question”. Until the war, Russia was the second largest arms exporter. In the lower price segment, the Kremlin was the most important exporter. It is foreseeable that the Russian defence industry will lose its position in the global security architecture. In the coming years, they have to produce for their own troops. In addition, the performance of Russian weapon systems in Ukraine appears weak.
The technical defects in missiles were unexpectedly numerous; Russian tanks apparently cannot aim while moving. Images of broken-down vehicles went around the world. Drones had to be bought in Iran and prestige projects such as the A-14 main battle tank or the Uran-9 unmanned tank are still not found on the battlegrounds. The hypersonic missile “Kinshal”, which is presented as unstoppable, was shot down several times by Western air defence systems and the Black Fleet can hardly defend itself against missiles and maritime drones. Many of Russia’s former customers will buy weapons from China.
Over the last two decades, the Chinese defence sector has already multiplied and there is no shortage of industrial capacity. Chinese technology is getting better and better. Long story short: If your neighbour has a BYD, better to have a Mercedes and not a Lada.
The Author is the Director of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (KAS). The KAS works to promote political and economic dialogue between India and Germany.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal and do not reflect the official position or policy of Financial Express Online. Reproducing this content without permission is prohibited.
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