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Welcome back. Eight days from now, Turkey will hold presidential and parliamentary elections, the outcome of which will determine the shape of the nation’s democracy, economy and foreign policy. It is a sign of Turkey’s regional power, and its weight in the wider international system, that policymakers in western capitals, Moscow, the Middle East and beyond are watching with extreme interest. I’m at tony.barber@ft.com.
The elections are taking place in a year and on a day filled with resonance for modern Turkish history. It was 100 years ago, in October 1923, that the Turkish republic was created, putting the country on a largely secular political path that broke with its Ottoman past. This path continued until the turn under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has been in power since 2003, to an imperious, neo-Islamist style of rule that, for some commentators, recalls the reign of the sultans.
May 14 happens to be the 73rd anniversary of another momentous event in Turkey. In parliamentary elections that day in 1950, the post-Ottoman political establishment lost power in what were the freest elections up to that point in the country’s history. In came Adnan Menderes, leader of the opposition Democratic party, as prime minister. It seemed a breakthrough for Turkish democracy, but it wasn’t decisive: 10 years later, a military coup overthrew Menderes, who was hanged in 1961.
Doubtless the anti-Erdoğan opposition dreams of a 1950-style victory next weekend. But how likely is that, given Turkey’s lurch to strongman rule under Erdoğan? And even if the opposition were to win, what in practice would change in Turkey’s domestic and international policies?
Mirage of a level playing field
On the face of things, the elections promise to be closely fought. Opinion polls indicate that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, leader of a six-party opposition bloc, stands a chance of a narrow victory in the presidential contest over Erdoğan, perhaps in a second-round run-off vote that would be held on May 28.
In the parliamentary elections, Erdoğan’s Justice and Development party (AKP) and its partners appear to be in a similarly tight contest, and it is uncertain if they or the opposition can win an absolute majority of seats.
Unfortunately, the polls tell only half the story.
As Nathalie Tocci, director of Italy’s Institute of International Affairs, writes for the Politico website, “Turkey’s election will take place in an increasingly undemocratic environment”.
In an article for Foreign Policy magazine, Steven Cook amplifies the point:
“Since 2003, Erdoğan and his . . . AKP have hollowed out, bent and fashioned political institutions to ensure their grip on power . . . The vast majority of Turkey’s once boisterous, if not always responsible, media can now be relied on to recite the government line. The judiciary that was once a redoubt of the secular nationalist establishment is now the preserve of AKP supporters.
“Purges have now become a feature of Turkish politics.”
In other words, the odds are tilted from the start against Kılıçdaroğlu and the opposition alliance. True, an opposition candidate overcame government pressure to win a remarkable victory in Istanbul’s mayoral election of 2019.
But the salient point is that this result, though a reminder that the democratic instincts of Turkish society remain vibrant, did not fundamentally challenge Erdoğan’s power at the national level. Moreover, the victorious candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu, was sentenced to prison in December and effectively barred from taking part in this year’s presidential contest.
So the question is: if he were to lose the presidential race, would Erdoğan actually accept defeat? Or would he find some way of overturning the result, through judicial intervention or a vote recount or some other means?
I am not at all convinced that Erdoğan is ready or willing to walk away from a system of immense presidential power that he built for himself.
Consequences of an Erdoğan victory
It is difficult to imagine any circumstances in which Erdoğan’s re-election would result in political liberalisation at home. A tightening of the screws would add to the frictions between Turkey and its western allies that have steadily grown, the longer he has been in power.
In this policy brief for the Centre for European Reform think-tank, Luigi Scazzieri outlines the possible consequences of an Erdoğan victory:
1. Louder calls in Europe to formally end Turkey’s EU accession process, which is in the deep freeze but which both sides have until now had a certain interest in pretending is still going on
2. A rise in tensions between Ankara and Athens and Nicosia, which might lead to pressure for more EU economic sanctions on Turkey, after a package of rather limited measures imposed in 2020
3. Strains with the US and Europe over Turkey’s relations with Russia, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine
4. Still more difficulties with the west if Erdoğan maintains his veto on Sweden’s Nato entry
Reading a range of commentaries on the Turkish elections, I sense that Scazzieri’s gloomy prognosis represents the consensus view.
But there are dissenters, such as Ioannis Alexios Zepos, a distinguished Greek former ambassador. In this article for the Athens Voice, Zepos suggests that the terrible earthquake that struck Turkey in February served to ease tensions between Ankara and Athens by reminding each side of their shared humanitarian concerns.
He adds: “I dare to say that possibly the re-election of President Erdoğan and a Turkish AKP government friendly to him will create a more favourable climate and relative flexibility on the Turkish side, as opposed to a total change in the neighbour that will bring to power a new and ambitious president and a multi-party leadership that will possibly want [to] prove at every step how decisive it is in managing the various serious issues . . . ”
Consequences of an opposition victory
Zepos is not alone in questioning whether an opposition victory would really transform Turkish policies.
On the plus side, there would surely be a more democratic spirit in domestic politics — but I wonder if, once in office, Kılıçdaroğlu would actually carry out his promise to dismantle the executive presidency set up by Erdoğan and return Turkey to a more parliamentary system. After all, he would need all the power he can muster to overcome resistance from AKP leftovers in the government machinery.
A new president might also embrace more rational economic policies, abandoning the idiosyncratic initiatives of Erdoğan that have driven up inflation and squeezed businesses and consumers.
As Marc Pierini and Francesco Siccardi write for Carnegie Europe, there could also be a calming of tensions between Turkey and the west — but not in all areas.
Take Cyprus. It is far from clear that any new president or government in Ankara would give up Turkey’s support for the breakaway Turkish Cypriot statelet in northern Cyprus, or make concessions on the exploitation of energy resources in the eastern Mediterranean.
Kılıçdaroğlu might pursue reconciliation with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, a line Erdoğan himself has hinted at. That would complicate Turkey’s relations with the US.
As for Turkey’s relations with Russia, the present policy of being “pro-Kyiv without being overtly anti-Moscow” might remain largely unchanged. Burgeoning economic ties benefit Turkey: it has not only refrained from joining western sanctions against Moscow, but has enjoyed a boom in exports to Russia since the invasion of Ukraine.
All this reflects a widely shared view among Turkey’s political classes that an independent foreign policy — including Nato membership but in other ways balanced between the west, Russia, China and other powers — best serves the national interest.
That view, in turn, derives from long-term changes in the attitude of much of Turkish society towards the US, which is seen far less favourably than a generation ago, and the EU, which Turks now think their country has little chance of joining any time soon.
Still, I do not wish to end on a sour note. As Pierini and Siccardi observe, one unambiguously positive result of a new Turkish government would surely be that “a professional and dignified dialogue would be reinstated between Ankara and western capitals. This would be a major relief for Berlin, Brussels, London, Paris and Washington.”
All in all, an opposition election victory, followed by Erdoğan’s departure from power, would be a truly extraordinary event.
But will it happen? Vote here.
Political and economic implications of the Turkish earthquakes — an analysis by Hürcan Aslı Aksoy and Salim Çevik for the German Institute for International and Security Affairs
Tony’s picks of the week
Tunisia seemed to be north Africa’s most promising example of democratic change after the 2010-11 Arab Spring uprisings, but its descent into autocracy is alarming its European neighbours, the FT’s Heba Saleh writes in a Big Read analysis
Reconstructing Ukraine will be a formidable task not just because of the need to restore physical assets, but because of immense human losses through emigration and war casualties, Michael Emerson explains for the Swedish Institute of International Affairs
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