Czech Republic: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2023 Article IV Mission

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Czech Republic: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2023 Article IV Mission







November 22, 2023







A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.









Prague, The Czech Republic: The Czech Republic’s economic growth slowed considerably following Russia’s
war in Ukraine, reflecting disruptions in global value chains, significant
increases in energy and other commodity prices, an erosion in real wages,
and a necessary tightening in monetary policy. Growth is expected to pick
up in 2024—led by consumption and fixed investment, as inflation fades and
real income starts rising again, supported by net exports. Nevertheless,
GDP is unlikely to reach the levels that would have been given by its
pre-pandemic trend by 2028. Inflation, having peaked in 2022, is projected
to meet its target by early 2025. Risks are tilted to the downside for
activity and to the upside for inflation.

Key Policy Recommendations

  • Monetary policy.Staff recommends
    keeping the policy stance tight for some time to ensure inflation
    returns to target in a timely manner and to reduce the risk of an
    upward shift in inflation expectations. High uncertainty calls for a
    flexible approach to policy setting .
  • Fiscal policy.Given
    the uncertain outlook, automatic stabilizers should function fully.
    Despite a low debt-to-GDP ratio, preserving and enhancing policy space
    will be vital to address future shocks, support economic transformation,
    and help ensure long-term debt sustainability

    .
  • Macrofinancial policies. Current levels of
    the countercyclical capital buffer, loan-to-value and debt-to-income
    ratios seem appropriate given that the risk of the real estate
    exposures substantially diminished. Reactivating the
    debt-service-to-income ratio would be advisable to help manage
    potential systemic risks. Closely monitoring the risks of an increasing
    share of euro-denominated bank loans is warranted.
  • Structural policies.With the economy
    being impacted by structural changes, including population aging and a
    global shift away from fossil-fuel based power, aiding labor and
    capital reallocation, boosting digitalization and productivity, and
    accelerating the green transformation are key goals.


Outlook and Risks


  • Economic activity slowed down notably in 2023 but a rebound is
    expected in 2024, driven by a recovery in domestic demand.

    In 2023 real GDP growth is estimated to have declined to -0.4 percent,
    mainly reflecting a decline in household consumption amidst a
    significant fall in real wages, deteriorating consumer sentiment, and
    heightened uncertainty. Growth is projected to increase to about 1.2
    percent in 2024, mainly driven by a recovery of consumption and fixed
    investment, as inflation declines, and real wages recover. Aggregate
    investment will be dampened by subdued public investment, mainly due to
    a gradual phase in of the new cycle of the EU investment and structural
    funds (2021-2027). Growth in net exports will continue to positively
    contribute to overall growth, with elevated unfulfilled orders
    continuing to be completed as supply disruptions ease. The labor market
    is projected to marginally tighten in 2024, as economic activity
    improves, with the unemployment rate decreasing modestly to about 2.6
    percent. Wage growth is projected to decline gradually as real wages
    catch up towards labor productivity and purchasing power is restored.
    However, staff projects the recovery in real wages and real unit labor
    costs to be matched by a compression in profit shares back to their
    pre-energy-shock levels, given recovering but still subdued demand
    levels, allowing the disinflation process to continue.

  • Inflation is projected to meet the CNB’s target by early 2025.

    The ongoing disinflation reflects the diminishing impact of price
    shocks from commodity prices and a substantial decrease in domestic
    demand pressures. This is apparent in falling core inflation, which
    primarily reflects the dampening effect of the tight monetary policy
    stance. Continued drops in commodity prices (food and fuel) are
    expected to support a fall in administered price inflation. As
    anticipated, the downward trend in headline inflation paused in 2023Q4
    due to a statistical base effect—reflecting last year’s drop in
    electricity prices caused by the government’s energy savings tariff.
    Once this base effect subsides, the decline in inflation is projected
    to resume.

Risks to the growth outlook are tilted to the downside.
Spillovers from a weaker global outlook remain a downside risk. Economic
activity and inflation could negatively be affected by a possible renewed
surge in global energy prices, new supply chain disruptions, or an increase
in geopolitical tensions, and potential broader geo-economic fragmentation.
Heightened global financial volatility due to stress in global financial
markets could negatively impact pricing and availability of financing. While
a low probability event, a disorderly house price correction could impair
banks’ and households’ balance sheets—markedly tightening financial
conditions—and adversely impacting aggregate demand. While vulnerabilities
in the financial sector exist, financial stability risks appear contained
given the strong buffers and profitability of the banking system.

  • Risks to inflation are tilted to the upside.These
    relate to inflation expectations becoming untethered—against the
    backdrop of high inflation, a tight labor market and the currently
    elevated but declining household saving rate. Inflation expectations
    have been decreasing but remain above the inflation target. Moreover,
    inflation pressures could also arise from strong wage growth and a
    failure of profit margins to compress rapidly in an environment of
    rebounding growth, resulting in stronger repricing of goods and
    services. Also, inflation expectations could rise if new global energy
    or commodity price shocks arise or if the expected increase in
    administered prices reverses the downward inflation momentum.
    Additionally, an abrupt return of the household saving rate to near
    long-term average levels could boost household consumption and heighten
    demand driven inflationary pressures. A falling differential in policy
    interest rates vis-a-vis major central banks or geopolitical shifts in
    regional sentiment could exert depreciation pressure on the koruna and
    add to inflationary pressures. On the other hand, a slower recovery than
    expected in the baseline or an unexpected significant fall in global
    demand could accelerate the convergence of inflation to the target.
  • Monetary Policy


Given high uncertainty on the persistence of inflation, staff
recommends maintaining a tight monetary policy stance until there is
firm evidence that inflation is on course to converge to target.

Although the policy rate has remained unchanged since June 2022, recent
decreases in inflation and its expectations have raised the ex-ante real
policy interest rate and tightened the monetary policy stance. Given
heightened profit shares the ongoing recovery in real wages can be absorbed
by firms without adding significant upward pressure on prices, allowing the
disinflation to continue. This will require, however, aggregate demand to
remain contained. In the absence of sharp downside surprises in inflation,
staff advises to maintain a tight monetary policy stance—by keeping the
nominal policy rate broadly unchanged through early 2024—to consolidate the
disinflation process and provide insurance against a costly de-anchoring of
inflation expectations. Thereafter, the nominal policy interest rate could
be lowered cautiously and gradually, consistent with the decline in
inflation, with a pace that could be accelerated if inflation expectations
align faster to the target than envisaged. Given high uncertainty around the
path of commodity prices, wages, profits, and inflation, a data-driven,
meeting-by-meeting approach to determine the interest rate path remains
essential.

  • Fiscal Policy

  • Fiscal plans for 2024 appropriately emphasize consolidation, but
    fiscal policy should remain flexible given the uncertain outlook.

    In cyclically adjusted terms, staff projects the fiscal deficit to
    contract by 1.3 percent of potential GDP. The contractionary stance is
    appropriate to support disinflation efforts, with the output gap set to
    nearly close in 2024. However, given uncertainty on the growth outlook,
    it is prudent to allow automatic stabilizers to operate.


  • Over the medium-term, fiscal policy is guided by Czechia’s fiscal
    responsibility act (FRA), which sets a minimum fiscal consolidation
    path that delivers a sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio and a low
    prudent fiscal balance.

    During the pandemic, fiscal balances were allowed to deviate from the
    medium-term objective (MTO) in the FRA, with a clear fiscal
    consolidation path back to target. In line with this, staff’s baseline
    envisages a debt-to-GDP ratio of 42.5 percent and a structural balance
    of -0.8 percent of potential GDP by 2028, which is consistent with the
    MTO—a structural balance of -0.75 percent of GDP. Czechia is at a low
    overall risk of sovereign stress; hence, reaching the MTO by 2028 will
    contribute to keeping debt sustainable over the medium term. The
    November 2023 fiscal outlook identifies measures through 2025 but
    reaching the MTO would require identifying additional measures.

  • In the medium and long term, spending pressures will increase to
    facilitate economic transformation toward a green digital economy
    and address the impact of population aging.

    The economic challenges of global technological shifts and population
    aging calls for structural reforms, investments, and efforts to ease
    the reallocation of labor and capital. The structural transformation
    may entail a heavy burden on some segments of the population, requiring
    social safety net support. Public sector infrastructure will need to be
    adapted to accommodate clean energy initiatives and digitization. To
    ensure a skilled workforce aligned with emerging activities, active
    labor market policies (ALMP) and ongoing education system reforms will
    be imperative. The aging population will give rise to a pension funding
    gap in the long-term. For intergenerational fairness and to avoid
    disruptive fiscal adjustments, the actuarial deficit of the pension
    system would call for higher general government structural balances
    than the currently targeted MTO. Also, an additional buffer is
    warranted to protect against future shocks and fiscal risks.


Although EU funds will cover part of the forthcoming spending
pressures, additional fiscal measures will be required.

These should include growth-friendly tax measures, reprioritization of
spending and improved spending efficiency. Staff recommends the following
measures:


  • As the recovery takes hold, ensure that the Personal Income Tax
    (PIT) and real estate related taxes deliver pre-pandemic tax
    revenue as a percentage of GDP.

    This would yield above 1.5 percent of GDP. It is crucial to note that
    the reduction of the PIT was originally presented as a temporary
    measure.
  • Further advance pension reform. Staff welcomes recent
    regulatory reforms to the pension system. These initial steps need to
    be complemented with additional reforms to improve the long-term
    sustainability of the pension system, including the linking of
    retirement age to life expectancy.
  • Macroprudential and Financial Sector Policies

  • The macroprudential policy setting is broadly adequate but the
    deactivation of the debt-service-to-income ratio should be
    reconsidered.

    Estimates of the financial cycle suggest the partial release of the
    Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) was justified. Staff also supports
    maintaining the Loan-to-Value (LTV) and Debt-to-Income (DTI) ratios at
    current levels, as the implementation of borrower-based measures has
    contributed to responsible lending practices and lowered the systemic
    risk in the banking sector. Although the increase in policy rates and
    its transmission toward lending rates made the Debt-Service-to-Income
    (DSTI) levels more binding, deactivating the DSTI allows banks to
    provide potentially riskier loans from a DSTI perspective.

    Staff therefore recommends reinstating this instrument, and going
    forward, recalibrating and improving its design, including by
    legislative changes, rather than its deactivation and reactivation.


Staff assesses that the banking sector is broadly resilient.

Financial sector indicators point to a well-capitalized, liquid, and
profitable banking system compared to its European peers. Staff welcomes
the improvements in supervisory risk measurement for sectoral/ individual
exposures and reiterates the importance of further progress in this area.
However, pockets of vulnerability remain and require close monitoring.


  • The risks associated to the increase in the euroization of
    corporate loans need to be carefully scrutinized.

    Staff welcomes the incorporation of these risks into the CNB’s
    financial stability analysis, and the capital requirements on risks
    associated to banks’ FX positions. Although stress test results suggest
    that these risks are not systemically important, close monitoring of
    the credit, exchange rate, and counterparty risks, including in
    derivative transactions, are warranted.

  • Since the pandemic, the banking sector’s direct risk exposure to
    the Treasury increased but remains contained.

    While sovereign risk is low and not expected to change, exposures need
    to be monitored.

  • Although risks from real estate exposures have diminished
    substantially, they require continued monitoring.

    The evolution of loan quality over the cycle, and possible
    nonperforming loans down the line, should continue to be managed.
  • Structural Policies


Policies should support the envisaged structural transformation of
industries, including towards a greener economy, by facilitating the
reallocation of capital and labor, and advancing technological
innovation.

To support the green transformation of the economy,
the government has set out a decarbonization strategy. The
goals are to achieve a greener energy mix—by phasing out coal by 2033,
while increasing the shares of renewables and nuclear energy—and bolstering
energy efficiency. Reaching these goals is expected to help Czechia meet
European climate and energy targets by 2030. The strategy is to split the
cost of the needed investment for decarbonization between the public and
private sectors. Investment needs by 2050 are estimated at about CZK 3.5
trillion of which about CZK 1-1.2 trillion are identified from public
support including EU funds. To encourage private investment, carbon prices
under EU’s ETS1 and ETS2 (starting in 2027), which together will cover most
sources of emissions, will tilt relative prices toward bolstering greener
energy sources, while encouraging efficiency. Private investment in green
sources will also be encouraged by regulatory guidance, including banning
the registration of new fossil-fuel vehicles within the next decade and
setting building requirements for energy efficiency, among others.
Additional incentives, recommended by staff, may include the use of
feebates in the agriculture sector (and other sectors not covered under the
European Trading Systems), targeted subsidies for R&D investment and
faster rates of depreciation of machinery and equipment that use fossil
fuels if they are replaced by those that use clean fuels.


Structural reforms can help facilitate the reallocation of capital.

Streamlining regulations related to business establishment and insolvency
is essential for promoting corporate restructuring and improving capital
reallocation. Streamlining Czechia’s business regulatory framework,
including by simplifying the construction permitting process, should
enhance the ease of doing business. Sustained private investment relies on
improved SMEs’ access to alternative funding sources, in particular venture
capital and equity financing.


To facilitate labor reallocation, active labor market policies could
play a useful role.

Training and lifelong learning are crucial to aid in workers’ transition to
growing sectors of the economy. Policymakers should proactively facilitate
engagement, effective job matching, and the cross-sectional reallocation of
workers through increased investments in ALMPs, which encompass reskilling
and vocational training initiatives. Staff welcomes the government’s

Labor Market Prediction Project

(KOMPAS) designed to identify mismatches between labor demand and supply
and provide job search assistance. Modernized vocational education can
develop specific skills and raise the economy’s adaptability to structural
change. The government’s Database of Retraining and Further Education
Courses is important to support the upskilling and reskilling. Sustaining
key education and curricula reforms requires adequate resources.


To improve labor force participation and alleviate labor shortages,
staff recommends the following:


  • Stepping up policies to enhance employment prospects for
    disadvantaged groups.

    Staff welcomes the Job Integration Program (effective 2024). Improving
    vocational training and education in technical and digital skills
    remains essential. Continued efforts to integrate women with young
    children should build on recent improvements in childcare provision and
    early childhood education, and target more flexible use of parental
    allowances and enhanced opportunities for job searching. A greater use
    of flexible and part-time work arrangements would also help enhance
    participation.

  • Continuing efforts to effectively integrate refugees and facilitate
    the inflow of migrants.

    The provision of language training, childcare, and job search support
    should continue to support refugees. The recently developed “pathways
    to work” program to support provision of skills to high-school
    immigrant children is welcome. Efforts to develop an immigration
    point-based system should continue.


Structural reforms should also support technological innovation.

Incentives for R&D could boost productivity and create high value-added
sectors.Providing targeted support to emerging and
innovative firms encourages technological advancement and innovation.
Implementation of the

Innovation Strategy

and

National Development Plan

is important to foster the technical and digital competencies essential for
high productivity sectors, particularly in Knowledge Intensive Sectors.
Planned reforms under the Recovery and Resilience Facility to provide
digital equipment to schools, revise the IT curriculum, expand life-long
learning in digital technologies, and implement the new digital governance
structure should be accelerated.


The IMF team thanks the Czech authorities and other counterparts for
their warm hospitality, flexibility, and high-quality discussions.


IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson






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