A new Chinese era: security and control

Two statements from Chinese leaders this week should provide pause for reflection, if not alarm. Xi Jinping, China’s leader who begins an unprecedented third term as president, named the US as the force behind the “containment”, “encirclement” and “suppression” of China. Foreign minister Qin Gang went further. “If the US doesn’t hit the brakes and continues to barrel down the wrong track, no amount of guardrails can prevent the carriage from derailing and crashing, and there will surely be conflict and confrontation,” he said.

If these had been impromptu remarks, they may have carried less weight. But as prepared statements around the annual National People’s Congress meeting in Beijing, they leave little room for doubt. They are consistent with several other signs that China is preparing itself for a possible conflict.

This is not to say that Beijing desires conflict, let alone superpower war. But it does underline the fact that national security has become the priority in almost every facet of Chinese governance. No fewer than 16 aspects of the central government’s work are now officially classified as matters of national security, including politics, economics, cyber space, ecology and others.

It may be time to define a new Chinese era. More than four decades of “reform and opening” helped elevate China’s share of global gross domestic product from 1.8 per cent in 1978 to 18 per cent in 2022 in nominal terms. But a period of “security and control” has now dawned. Beijing’s main focus is no longer economic expansion but rather fostering self-reliance and resilience in an environment of more modest growth.

Underlining this mood, this week Xi called for “more quickly elevating the armed forces to world-class standards”. He added that China must maximise its “national strategic capabilities” to cope with “strategic risks, safeguard strategic interests and realise strategic objectives”. His exhortation comes after the US last month shot down a Chinese high-altitude balloon that had intruded into its airspace, throwing off course a planned visit to China by US secretary of state Antony Blinken. US and Chinese interests collide on a wide range of issues including Taiwan, Russia’s assault on Ukraine and global technology leadership.

The danger is that mutual animosity and suspicion motivates an escalatory cycle. The US has legitimate concerns over China’s emergence as a strategic rival but it also needs to take into account how its moves to contain China — such as its “entity list” restrictions on hundreds of Chinese companies — only deepen mistrust in Beijing.

There is already ample evidence that Beijing is hunkering down. In the economic realm, it set a growth target for this year of “about 5 per cent”, its lowest in three decades. Li Keqiang, the outgoing premier, said that this modest target was part of a plan to “prioritise economic stability”.

A plan to restructure the science and technology ministry is similarly motivated by security concerns. Its crucial priority is to boost technological self-reliance to counter “external containment”. Beijing also announced plans to set up a new financial watchdog to close multiple loopholes that create weaknesses in its $57tn financial industry.

All this constitutes a critical moment. The US and China, along with their partners, should recognise the dangers in play. Prophesying conflict, preparing for strife and naming potential enemies is a slippery slope towards unimaginable hostility. Beijing and Washington should pause, reflect and expend genuine effort to reinstitute guardrails against future catastrophe.