The build-up of the Communist Party of China’s (CPC’s) capability to influence global narratives appears to have been in sync with the nation’s ascent in the global order, as revealed in a report from the US State Department’s Global Engagement Center that monitors foreign disinformation.

The propensity of Communist parties to shape narratives is universally acknowledged. However, in China’s case, the shift from Deng Xiaoping’s maxim “tāo guāng yǎng huì”, which emphasised keeping a low profile, to Xi Jinping’s “fènfā y?’u wéi” that pushes for achieving things, has meant a greater scrutiny of the CPC’s disinformation toolkit in recent times. Second, China’s rise as the second-largest economy in the world has enabled it to convert wealth into power and influence. The report notes that the CPC has used its cash piles to shape narratives on territorial and maritime disputes, economic engagement, and human rights, while drowning out versions of its rivals.

The news media is a primary source through which people consume information; however, for Beijing, it is the main conduit in its battle for hearts and minds. In East Africa, the Chinese regime paid a newspaper to publish favourable news items, which were presented as independent reportage. Shortly after Honduras switched diplomatic recognition  from Taipei  to Beijing earlier this year, the Chinese-state outlets opened bureaus and inked a pact on sharing content with Honduran state media. Under the guise of capacity-building programmes, local journalists will be schooled in seeing the Americas through a Chinese prism. Nearer home, through the aegis of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) framework, deepening of cooperation to “combat disinformation” is being pushed. The proposal envisages setting up a Sino-Pak mechanism to monitor reports from think-tanks, media outlets, Confucius centres, and local Chinese companies. It must be noted that China’s deepening economic engagement in Pakistan had created a pushback from places like Balochistan, resulting in attacks on Chinese nationals stationed in Pakistan. Thus, through the joint mechanism, China’s aim was to manipulate the information environment in Pakistan to secure its interests. 

When the Chinese regime is unable to make the Fourth Estate amenable to its interests, other institutions come in handy. Both Chinese state-owned enterprises and private companies have taken the legal route to suppress critics. A Chinese company filed a lawsuit against a writer in Taiwan, demanding a retraction of a piece or amending it with information that it provided. Telcom major (Huawei) filed a defamation suit against a researcher in France for merely claiming that the firm had ties to the Party-state. The US report notes that China Inc uses those jurisdictions where there is a high probability of judges imposing stiff legal costs that drain out a defendant’s financial resources.

It is said that diplomats are sent to lie abroad for the good of their country. But in his book, China’s Civilian Army, Peter Martin posits that Chinese leader Zhou Enlai moulded its envoys as “People’s Liberation Army in civilian clothing” sent overseas to wage wars. In the Xi era, this indoctrination has transmogrified into the high-pitched wolf-warrior diplomacy. For example, the Chinese embassy warned the Indian media to desist from referring to Taiwan as a country. Thus, the US report cites an instance of China’s diplomatic corps far exceeding their brief in Germany, where they pressured universities to cancel discussions on a book about Mr Xi. The presence of its diplomatic corps is increasing on social media platforms, this is accompanied by a force multiplier in the form of bot networks that either amplify important online posts by envoys, or suppress sensitive hashtags on Xinjiang during the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. Chinese technology, too, aids in this battle of narratives with PRC-made phones being programmed to censor phrases like “Taiwan independence”, “Free Tibet”, and “democracy”.

To conclude, since its inception, the CPC has been consolidating its legitimacy at home and abroad. Initially, the Party-state manipulated the message through ideologically-committed sympathisers. Since Mr Xi’s ascent to power, there has been a greater push within the CPC to make “China’s narrative the world’s story”. To pursue this goal, China’s toolkit weaponises technology and its economic statecraft that are backed by legionaries masquerading as diplomatic corps. In the aftermath of the 2020 Galwan clashes, India systematically curbed instruments that China uses to expand its influence. Agreements signed between Indian universities and China on Confucius centres, and educational cooperation between higher education institutions were reviewed. India banned several Chinese apps, chiefly among them a short-video hosting service TikTok.

The US report observes that China is constantly improving its techniques to manipulate the outcomes of elections, with its stock-in-trade being disinformation about political parties, candidates, and creating rifts between social groups. The big question is, while India has been battening down the hatches with respect to Chinese influence, do content sharing tie-ups between Chinese news agencies and Indian media, which the report red-flags, unwittingly allow the latter to become the proverbial borrowed boat for Chinese propaganda to cross the sea? Managing the China challenge requires a whole-of-nation approach, and the media too will have to reassess their own priorities.

The writers are with Observer Research Foundation